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Genocidal processes: social death in Xinjiang
David Tobin
School of East Asian Studies, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
ABSTRACT
Genocide is a series of long-term processes emerging from “states of
emergency” to convert targeted groups and secure the nation. This paper
builds on Critical Genocide Studies literature to historically contextualize
China’s “fusion” policy, a narrative of emergency officially explaining extra-
legal internment camps and inter-generational separation in Xinjiang.
Although China’s policymakers traditionally frame “one-nation-one-state
thinking” as Western colonialism, critical approaches to Chinese politics show
the party-state frames ethnic identities through colonial binaries of
backward/modern and savagery/civilization. How does the party-state’s
“historic mission” to overcome colonial “humiliation” promote colonialism?
The paper analyses how routine, dehumanizing official narratives of identity
and danger enable genocides, conceptualized as planned processes of social
death by attrition. It argues that contemporary “fusion” policy interweaves
cultural superiority and ethnocentric developmentalism, seeking to resolve
China’s “ethnic problem” and decolonize Xinjiang through social death of
Turkic Muslims.
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Introduction
China’s policymakers traditionally frame “one-nation-one-state thinking” as
Western colonialism and ethno-nationalism.1 Yet critical approaches to
China’s ethnic politics2 and literature on identities in Xinjiang3 show how
colonial narrative binaries of backward/modern and savagery/civilization
are not peculiarly Western. Similarly, comparative approaches analyse com-
parable violence against minorities in postcolonial societies.4 Nevertheless,
China’s ethnic policy scholars framed fixed identity boundaries between
Western nationalism and Chinese civilization5 to argue that ethnic theory
must be Sinicized to resolve China’s “ethnic problem”.6 Xi Jinping’s7
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subsequent declaration that “cultural identity” is the “soul of every minzu”8
confirmed China’s ethnic policy shift from nominal cultural pluralism to
“fusion” ( jiaorong), an assimilation model.9 How does the Chinese Communist
Party’s (CCP) “historic mission” to overcome colonial “humiliation” promote
colonialism? The paper shows how “fusion” interweaves colonial and nation-
alist thought in “semantic hybridity”,10 securing China’s “Great Revival” by
resolving the “ethnic problem” of Turkic-speaking Muslims.
Genocide is a process, not an event,11 emerging from perpetual “states of
emergency” to convert barbarians for civilization’s survival.12 This paper histor-
icizes “fusion”, a narrative of emergency in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region (XUAR), which explains practices of extra-legal internment, inter-gen-
erational separation, forced labour, and forced sterilization.13 The term “geno-
cidal practices”, analytically distinct from legal conceptualizations,14 builds on
new directions in genocide studies.15 Genocide emerges from gradual asser-
tions of power to reorganize identities considered superfluous or threatening
in long-term ethnocentric narratives, rather than rapid, irrational descents into
barbarism.16 In official Chinese narratives, the Han majority are imagined as a
continuation of 2,000-year-old military settlements in Xinjiang, whose “settler
culture” and teleological “function” as “embodiment of China’s active spirit”
secure and “settle the frontier” (tunken shubian).17 Fei Xiaotong, China’s
most celebrated social scientist and key influence on official historiography,
narrates China’s historical formation through expansion of Han armies and
“barbarians” “attraction” to China’s superior civilization as “new blood for
the Hans”.18 In official narratives, these older imperial desires to attract and
“Sinicise” ( jiaohua) barbarians interweave with resistance to colonialism, per-
plexing Anglophone audiences drawing from canonical genocide cases.
Long-term state violence in Xinjiang reflects different elements of Feierstein’s
four types of genocide: constituent, colonial, postcolonial, and reorganizing.19
Post-1949 state violence “destroys ideologically unacceptable populations”,
from armed Kazakhs dismissed in the 1950s as “bandits” after skirmishes with
Chinese troops following “peaceful liberation”20 to twenty-first century “ideo-
logical viruses”.21 Land seizures, coerced labour, and extra-legal treatment of
Xinjiang’s Indigenous peoples resemble older colonial genocides,22 “to rid a ter-
ritory of Indigenous inhabitants and appropriate it”, stigmatizing them as out-
siders and undeveloped “savages who ought to make way for civilisation”.23
The intent of state-run paramilitary organization, the Xinjiang Production and
Construction Corps (Bingtuan), to “turn pastureland into collective farms” with
“gun in one hand and plough in other”,24 sparked food shortages and mass
Kazakh migration to the Soviet Union (1959–1962).25 Today, the party-state
targets local populations for “re-education” and “fusion” in internment camps
and forced labour in ongoing postcolonial independence movements against
“Westernisation” and local “separatism”, described by Xi as interlinked, intensi-
fying “long-term struggles”.26 Since 1949, policy has fluctuated, defying
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mechanical explanation but state violence is enabled by long-term dehuma-
nization of non-Chinese peoples on PRC territory.
Critical Genocide studies27 historicizes contemporary genocidal practices,
unpacking case-specific context while identifying common themes linking
broad conditions promoting group annihilation and policy creating those con-
ditions.28 Dehumanization of Xinjiang’s Turkic Muslims is complex because
China is postcolonial with reference to its own imperial past in Central Asia
and in relations with Europe.29 The idea of China as unified nation and state,
emerged through intertwined political anxieties about internal Manchu dom-
inance and external European colonialism. Sun Yat-Sen strove to “restore the
Han” and save China from networks of corrupt Manchu and Western imperial-
ists.30 Mao Zedong vilified GMD ministries as “counting houses of our foreign
masters”, threatening China’s survival.31 Today, perpetual emergency narra-
tives persist in ubiquitous slogans: “without the CCP, there can be no new
China”. The CCP identifies “hostile foreign forces” and domestic “backward-
ness” as intertwined perpetual threats, describing Turkic identities as “historical
leftovers” of nineteenth century European “colonial manipulation”, threatening
to dismember China by running against the “flow of history” and the Great
Revival’s “sacred mission”.32 Xi’s signature slogan, “never forget our original
mission, continue our progress” captures the long-term intent of ethnic
policy and explains internment camps as eliminating inauthentic “colonial”
identities hindering China’s mission.33 The party-state narrates internment
camps and inter-generational separation, typical genocidal practices, as secur-
ing China from terrorism and colonialism.34
This paper focuses on how routinized, dehumanizing official narratives of
identity transformation enable genocidal processes. The first section conceptu-
alizes genocide as planned, permissive processes of social death by attrition,
enabled by narratives of existential need for reorganization of identity.
Section two historicizes “fusion” policy in long-term official narratives on
state power and ethnicity, which frame Xinjiang’s peoples as culturally inferior,
existential threats. The final section analyses implementation and impact of
“fusion” in “re-education” camps and state-run “boarding facilities” for children,
depicted by Indigenous artists as daily, felt experiences of social death. The
paper’s core argument is that “fusion” interweaves cultural superiority and
developmentalism, framing planned social death of Turkic Muslim identities
as decolonization and modernization of Xinjiang with Chinese traditions. This
resolution to China’s “ethnic problem” reflects cyclical human tragedies of
state violence to counter violence, irreducible to evil states or cultures.35
Section 1: Genocidal processes
This section theorizes genocide as planned and permissive processes of social
death by attrition. Destruction of the “essential foundations of a group’s life”
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depends on co-ordinated state plans to categorize groups according to con-
tribution to political goals.36 However, “most foreseeable intolerable harms
produced by inexcusable wrongs” to groups are social and diffuse, permitted
and enabled, rather than physically enacted by individuals.37 Long-term gen-
ocidal practices are neither primarily murderous nor traced to individual culp-
ability.38 Nevertheless, non-specialist usage of “genocide”, the “crime of
crimes” in International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s (ICTR) prosecution
case,39 excludes planned, permissive group destruction, fixated on physical
killings by hand in death camps. Popular physical conceptions of suffering
reflect implicit biological conceptualizations of identity, de-escalating the
urgency of gradual deprivation of essential life conditions. Critical Genocide
Studies shows that by “always looking for Birkenau”, biases towards tra-
ditional interpretations of canonical cases inhibit detection and understand-
ing of new genocidal practices.40One in five German Jews died in the Warsaw
Ghetto before 1942 deportations or “final solution”.41 Until the publication of
official sterilization documents in Xinjiang, Turkic peoples’ claims of genocide
were overlooked across the social sciences. Focusing on physical outcomes
and legal definitions reflects twentieth century state-centric geopolitics, over-
looking threats to stateless peoples and depoliticizing state-violence unless
state sovereignty is violated.42 Instead, framing genocide as social death
enables analysis of nonlinear genocidal processes that reorganize social
relations and identity.43
Genocide scholars agree “the word is new, the crime ancient” when
describing annihilation of Melos (fifth-century BCE) and Carthage (146
BCE).44 Genghis Khan’s thirteenth century genocides integrated Western
Xia territory into the Mongol empire, while eighteenth century Manchu
expansion incorporated eastern Turkestan into China, annihilating surrender-
ing Zunghars and renaming the territory, Xinjiang (“new frontier”).45
However, genocides are neither mechanical nor have all predictors been cat-
alogued.46 Arendt’s “total domination” in concentration camps referred to
deprivation of group social vitality, not predictable, machine-like order.47
Genocides are socially enacted, driven by connected and disconnected indi-
viduals and institutions, mechanistic in identifying peoples as threats yet
often chaotically implemented. Stanton’s “eight stages of genocide”,
defined through the UN Genocide Convention (UNCG),48 begins with “us
and them” classification and dehumanization, culminating in extermina-
tion.49 Fein’s “genocide by attrition” proceeds in five stages (identification,
rights-stripping, segregation, isolation, and concentration).50 Nevertheless,
different relations between variables make genocides non-linear, with
Kuper’s famous conclusion that a theory of genocide is impossible informing
Semelin’s study of how historical context shapes implementation.51
Genocide is often interpreted in international law as mass killings with
intent to physically destroy groups, preserving “the body of the group but
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allowing its very soul to be destroyed”.52 Lemkin coined the genocide term to
capture its cultural intent and effect, yet engineered weakening of targeted
groups’ social practices is often dismissed as inevitable effects of moderniz-
ation or cultural diffusion. Such politically dominant perspectives overlook
how anthropologists and Indigenous peoples conceive group maintenance
through social practices, reducing people to identity-less bodies.53 Social
death, Claudia Card’s term, builds on how social practices constitute
groups as groups, structuring and giving meaning to individuals’ lives. Phys-
ical death is not necessarily worse than “intolerable harms” of language loss,
trauma, and disconnection from community, therefore mass killings are ines-
sential to deprive groups of vitality and reproductive capacities.54
Describing German occupation across Europe, Lemkin explained, “geno-
cide does not necessarily mean immediate destruction of a nation” but
refers to “coordinated plans of different actions aiming at destruction of
essential foundations of the life of national groups”. 55 Genocide predates
industrialization and exterminatory racism was never a necessary component
of Fascism but German fascism industrialized genocide.56 Following Lemkin’s
lobbying, initial UNCG drafts included cultural dimensions but UN debates
concluded they could not be included alongside biological annihilation,
“mass murders in gas chambers”, and industrialized total war.57 Genocide’s
meaning was a negotiated compromise in inter-state negotiations amidst
total war. Nevertheless, convention drafters described cultural genocide as
legitimate and it plays a subsidiary role in the detection of group destruction
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, qualifying as war crimes and crimes
against humanity. The International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and ICTR found individuals guilty of genocide based on small-scale acts
in contexts of broader genocidal intent and practices to “destroy, in whole or
in part” national, ethnic, or religious groups.58 The UNCG’s focus on intent
acknowledges cultural dimensions and that physical destruction is inessential
because, unlike homicide, genocide does not refer to perpetrators’ success.59
Contemporary Genocide Studies reinvigorated Lemkin’s theory of geno-
cide as cultural, problematizing quantifying outcomes based on biological-
racial survival.60 The UNCG’s definition of group destruction “in whole or in
part”, based on Lemkin’s conceptualization, is often assumed to refer to quan-
tities of killings but Card shows how “in part” referred to “part” of a group’s
essential foundations, including language, religion, and child-rearing.61
Therefore, removal of Uyghur language as medium of instruction in 2004 rep-
resents destruction of group capacity to reproduce its cultural foundations.62
Genocidal processes emerge in postcolonial societies, including Thailand and
Indonesia, where identification and targeting of internal enemies are elite-led
state-building processes.63 Identifying these processes’ emergence in pre-
existing asymmetrical ethnic relations, supported by official narratives of
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dehumanization and transformation, helps detect genocide by attrition prior
to mass violence and when it does not include mass killings.64 Early warning
indicators in Xinjiang include the CCP’s 1950 decision to enlist Xinjiang’s
Muslims before they must “give up religion”.65
Critical Genocide Studies critiques “sociologically inadequate” dominant
understandings of genocide as rapid, mass killings.66 Going further, these
physical framings enable genocides by recirculating biological conceptions
of groups, de-escalating the moral urgency of gradual deprivation of identi-
ties and social vitality. The implications of language eradication and econ-
omic exclusion of minorities and Indigenous peoples in democratic states
relegated these practices to cultural genocide at the Genocide Convention
deliberations.67 The UNCG debates enabled genocide by attrition of Indigen-
ous peoples as only cultural or value-neutral modernization, tragically recy-
cling German Fascism’s biological-racial conceptualization of groups that
these deliberations were to prevent.
Genocides are never singular outbursts of irrational, quantifiable harm.
Empirical evidence from Cambodia, Warsaw ghetto, and Sudan, show how
genocides are complex, long-term processes of cultural annihilation, not
“directly murderous events” “tracked back to individual culpability”.68 Dualis-
tic separation of physical and social is reinforced by centring mass killings
while exempting gradual genocides, which are neither peculiarly Western
nor modern. Genocides unfold gradually in many forms, justified using
different logics embedded in different social contexts, but cause intolerable
harm, qualitatively experienced as social death. Subsequent sections
analyse how official narratives on China’s ethnic politics enable genocidal
processes and social death.
Section 2: “Fusion” as social death
This section historicizes contemporary CCP “fusion” policies, specifically how
narratives of China’s historic “ethnic problem” (minzu wenti) shape inclusion
and exclusion of Turkic-speaking Muslims. PRC policymakers and anthropol-
ogists have debated “fusion” narratives since the 1950s. However, “fusion”
emerged as explicit policy from the first Xinjiang Working Group Meetings,
responding to Han-Uyghur violence in 2009, with Hu Jintao declaring
“contact, communication, fusion” as party policy to end “relentless struggle
with Xinjiang’s separatist forces” and resolve the “ethnic problem”.69 Xi has
maintained a narrative emphasis on “long-term security”, “fusion”, and “leap-
frog development” in the party-state’s “glorious mission” in Xinjiang: “settling
the frontier is China’s millennia-long historical inheritance to develop and
defend the frontier”.70 However, explicit “Sinicisation of religion” policy and
Xi’s “furnace” metaphor to “fuse every minzu”71 de-emphasizes contact and
communication in favour of “fusion”, even reversing the ubiquitous “plurality
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and unity” (duoyuan yiti) concept to assert China’s cultural unity.72 James
Leibold argues Xi’s narrative of “cultural identity” as “soul of every minzu”
reoriented policy from “ethnocultural heterogeneity” to “virulent” “cultural
nationalism”.73 However, our analysis historicizes how “fusion” reflects
gradual shifts from nominal cultural pluralism towards explicit assimilation
to resolve the “ethnic problem” in China’s ethnic policy since 1949.
Xi Jinping74 and public intellectuals75 describe “new conditions” of
Western decline in a “post-American century” as unparalleled strategic
“window of opportunity” to transform international and ethnic relations.
“Fusion” policy’s timing is explained through a “window of opportunity” in
a “critical stability period”, while the West turns inward and Belt-and-Road-
Initiative (BRI) expands.76 Throughout perpetual “opening-and-reform”
(1978-onwards), Stalin’s 1931 slogan, “backward nations get beaten”, has
been reformulated by public intellectuals as nineteenth-century resistance
against the Manchu and European colonialism, explaining twenty-first-
century desires to “modernise” and secure China.77 Nevertheless, these expla-
nations of “fusion” are embedded in narratives of China’s unbroken “settler
culture” and its frontiers’ “ethnic problem”.
Following Manchu imperial expansion into “barbarian”-populated
“Western Regions” (xiyu), Eastern Turkestan was renamed “new frontier” (Xin-
jiang) in 1884.78 Uyghurs widely reject this naming as colonial, generally pre-
ferring “East Turkestan” or “homeland” (weten). Nineteenth century imperial
debates over whether to permit self-rule described Xinjiang as “barren waste-
land”.79Mao and Zhou Enlai considered the territory and its peoples as pieces
in China’s geopolitical “strategic chess game”,80 with “peaceful liberation” by
Chinese troops sparking skirmishes with armed Kazakhs, officially described
as “bandits”, until the mid-1950s.81 Mao and Zhou promised “self-determi-
nation” (zijue) for “every minzu”82 but after 1949, stressed that “self-determi-
nation” under socialism was “reactionary” and regional autonomy (zizhi) will
maintain territorial control of non-Han regions.83 Party-state narratives and
PRC constitution present formal equality of China’s 56 minzu.84 However,
the National Law on Regional Autonomy was designed to ensure minority
regions can “never be separated” and is explained through binary colonial
narratives that minorities must be “modernised” and their “scientific level”
raised by the state.85
Prior to 2012, the CCP’s nominal cultural pluralism celebrated diversity but
was confined within institution-building and policymaking to promote
gradual assimilation. Developmentalist binary identity narratives structured
party-state historiography, with policy documents explaining barbarians’will-
ingness to become Chinese because before “liberation” by “advanced”
Central Plains, Xinjiang’s peoples were “backward” and enslaved in natural
“frontier” subsistence.86 Trading “simple, uncomplicated assistance”, horses,
and other natural goods with Han “frontier-builders”, who supply “everything
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they need for daily living”, integrated barbarians into the “mutually comp-
lementary economy” ( jingji hubu) forming the Chinese people “since
ancient times”.87 These Han-centric official narratives interweave historical
materialism and civilizational superiority, defining Kazakh and Uyghur iden-
tity construction by “mode of production” (nomadism or animal husbandry),
while the Han’s timeless “active spirit” and “transcendent” “frontier-building
culture” (tunken wenhua) surpass material origins.88 China’s official founding
narratives in Xinjiang resemble Roosevelt’s “settler and pioneer” rescuing a
“great continent” from “squalid savages” and General Roca’s “virile people”
occupying “fertile lands” of “savages” for progress and security.89
From 1949 until the Xi-era, official and scholarly consensus was that “one-
nation, one-state” thinking contradicts China’s “national conditions” as a non-
Western multi-ethnic state.90 The party-state described tensions between
ethnic and national identity as the “ethnic problem”, resolved by “scientifi-
cally” identifying ethnic groups and providing de jure equality for all.91 Histori-
cal materialist class consciousness was to end China’s history of “ethnic
oppression” and promote “natural” assimilation (tonghua).92 The explicitly
geopolitical lens framing Xinjiang’s position in China shifted as the CCP’s
ethnic classification project (minzu shibie) reformulated Zhonghua Minzu to
mean 56 ethnic groups, replacing Liang Qichao’s and Sun Yat-sen’s concep-
tualization as “Han race” descending from Yellow Emperor.93 The CCP empha-
sized “scientific Marxism” in its China’s ethnic classification project but used
lineage records,94 focusing on differentiating majority Han from “non-Han”,
termed China’s “odd calculus” of “55 + 1”.95 Mao and Zhou’s framing of
ethnic relations as geopolitical “strategic chess game” to create safe frontiers
between Han China and European empires, considered “great Han chauvin-
ism” and “local minority nationalism” significant obstacles to the state’s
goals.96 However, Han’s “higher levels” of “political, economic, and cultural
development” conferred “special responsibility” to “develop minorities’
economy and culture”.97 Deng Xiaoping considered “lingering” discrimi-
nation as “haunting” by “bourgeois nationalist thought” and that “the
economy is foundation of resolving the minzu problem”.98 However, his ima-
gined teleological end was Chinese identity (Zhonghua Minzu). Adopting his-
torical materialism superimposed ethnocentric notions of progress onto
China’s imperial binaries (hua-yi), rather than decolonizing an imperial past.
Official resolution to the ethnic problem was traditionally framed through
narration of China as 56minzu in “plurality and unity” (duoyuan yiti) with Han
as “centripetal force” (ningjuli).99 This configuration drew from Fei Xiaotong,
LSE-trained structural functionalist, who narrated China’s formation through
Han territorial expansion and assimilation of barbarians (“new blood for the
Han”).100 Mongolian anthropologist, Jian Bozan, advised that “fusion” con-
ceals China’s history of “ethnic oppression” and promotes chauvinist assimi-
lation.101 However, official endorsement of Han-centric “fusion” recirculates
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chauvinist historiography, associated with Fan Wenlan of the Zhejiang school,
which considered Han identity authentic, superior, and continuous since the
Qin-Han era (221BCE-220CE), contrasted against minority identities as
modern Chinese political constructions.102 Today, Turkic and Islamic identi-
ties are officially described as inauthentic Western “colonial manipula-
tions”.103 “Ethnic unity” textbooks in Xinjiang’s schools, universities, and
cadre-training, narrate Han as “transcendent minzu” and “extinction” (xiao-
wang) of minority languages as progressive, “inevitable outcomes” of “mod-
ernisation”.104 The party-state narrates Zhonghua Minzu on terms by which it
critiques Western colonialism, by framing Indigenous cultures as teleologi-
cally superfluous and cultural annihilation as value-neutral “modernisation”.
Nation-building goals of securing territory and transforming identities
renders Xinjiang’s Turkic peoples superfluous in the same teleological under-
standing of history105 that justified European colonial and fascist genocides.
The twenty-first century CCP re-imagines Xinjiang through 5,000 years of
unbroken Chinese civilization and “fusion”, interweaving imperial traditions,
European colonial thought, and historical materialism. Mao’s “class struggle”
and Hu Jintao’s “scientific development” offered different economic plans but
both conceived minority identities as passively superstructural to the
economy and that material conditions naturally resolve the “ethnic
problem” through gradual assimilation.106 Jian Bozan described “ethnic
extinction” (minzu xiaowang) as violent, Western colonization, contrasted
against natural cultural fusion (tonghua)107 but xiaowang and Cultural Revo-
lution-era slogans, including “only if minzu exists can there be a minzu
problem”, re-emerged under Hu.108 Post-2009 “ethnic unity education” text-
books teach that “fusion” ( jiaorong) denotes “ethnic extinction” of minorities
as “highest stage” of “historical development”.109 Xi’s thinking builds on long-
term Chinese debates and gradual shifts towards assimilation, for example,
with “contact, communication, fusion” official policy following the Xinjiang
Working Group Meeting in 2010. However, Xi’s ethnic policy is officially cele-
brated as resolving China’s national “contradictions” by prioritizing state-
engineered “fusion”, unity, and security, over diversity and development.110
Following the first Xinjiang Working Group meeting, a “2nd generation” of
minzu policy scholars were unusually granted an online platform by the State
Ethnic Affairs Commission in 2012 to debate sensitive policy matters. They
insisted policymakers must resolve contradictions between plurality and
unity with “fusion” into Zhonghua Minzu or race-state (guozu), recommending
derecognizing the minority category, abandoning regional autonomy, and
Mandarin-medium-only education.111 The historical materialist “1st gener-
ation” argued that regional autonomy and ethnic equality preserve China’s
territorial integrity and ethnicity will naturally disappear with develop-
ment.112 The “first generation” warned China’s leaders “not to repeat the
same mistakes as the West”, framing diversity as Chinese tradition and
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fusion as “Han chauvinism”, whilst arguing for gradual assimilation.113 This
state-sponsored platform recirculated the logics of China’s Republican-era
debates between reformers and revolutionaries on assimilation or exclusion
of the “5 races” in struggles against the Manchu and European imperialism.114
The underlying logics of the 2012 debates was that securing China requires
resolving the “ethnic problem” of backward non-Han by enabling or promot-
ing their social death.115
Xi’s 19th Party Congress speeches subsequently de-recognized the ethnic
minorities concept, referring only to cadre recruitment but describing a
singular Zhonghua Minzu forty-three times, collocating with Great Revival
in twenty-seven instances.116 Minzu now officially refers to Zhonghua Minzu
and more accurately translates as “Chinese race”. Ma Rong celebrates how
Xi’s era “does not emphasise our minorities’ special nature or rights”,
having “fused into one big family” and “direction of history”.117 Xi’s approach
of “collective consciousness”118 drives organic unity (yiti) to supersede plur-
ality (duoyuan) and transcends “minzu discourse”. 119 Xi’s “historic” reorganiz-
ation of identity reinvigorates older imperial traditions that non-Han peoples
are “less civilised” and behind, not different. Abandoning “Western” minzu
thinking and derecognizing minorities is framed as reinvigorating imperial
traditions of “teaching barbarians to be Chinese” ( jiaohua) through “attrac-
tion”, the opposite of Western assimilation.120 Jiaohua appears in the camp
system’s “transformation education” titles and promotional videos illustrating
“vocational training” (learning Mandarin and chanting praise to Xi).121 The
Xinjiang Museum’s 2015 “Uyghur Culture” exhibit (Figure 1) publicly cele-
brated these binary relations of inferior, disappearing relics being consumed
by modern Han “frontier-builders”. The imagined teleological end of “fusion”
Figure 1. “Uyghur Culture”. Exhibit from Xinjiang Regional Museum, 2015. Photograph
by the author.
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is a non-Western China and the Sinicization of backward frontier barbarians
by modernizing Central Plains Han.
Since 1949, genocidal processes interweaving Han-centric “fusion” and
“modernisation” have promoted gradual social death of Turkic peoples.
“Fusion” physically contains and culturally reconstitutes Uyghurs in teleologi-
cal progress, as “backward” “historical leftovers”, “colonial manipulations”,
and obstacles to the “direction of history”. China’s multi-ethnic regional
autonomy system was originally designed to maintain territorial control of
frontiers and “modernise” peoples colonized by the Manchu. The CCP’s
gradual reorientation towards assimilation builds on long-term narratives of
“setter culture” and “modernisation” framing shifts to monolingual-medium
education in 2004 and “fusion” after 2009. Ma Rong considered this policy
necessary for China to reinvigorate its own traditions and “develop into a
modernised nation”.122 Official texts explained Mandarin is a “transcendent
language” communicating “modern information”, unlike Turkic languages,
because the Han are a “transcendent group”.123 “Fusion” crystallized during
2012 ethnic policy debates as explicit policy to reorganize identities and
save China in a “new era” (xin shidai) of global power and domestic insecurity.
Section 3: Social death in Xinjiang
This section analyses the application and impact of “fusion” in Xinjiang, focus-
ing on narrative framings of internment camps and secure “centralised board-
ing facilities” for children. Following Han-Uyghur violence in 2009 and 2014–
2015, camps and inter-generational separation were explained as processes
of “modernisation” and “de-extremification” to promote “fusion”. The party-
state interpreted inter-ethnic violence through its pre-existing narrative
lens that framed Xinjiang’s peoples as “backward” problems. In 2009, Xin-
jiang’s high-school textbooks taught ethnic unity is built on relations
between advanced Han and undeveloped minorities, the basis of “national
strength” and China’s Great Revival.124 Genocides are often sparked by threa-
tened states125 but the referent of security here is politically constructed
identity, not material survival, and non-Chinese identity is an existential
threat. By “looking for Birkenau”, international media overlooks longer-term
narratives of social death described by Indigenous artists and intellectuals,
enabling genocidal practices to persist unchallenged as genocide.
“Fusion” policy emerged in party-state meetings on breaking cycles of
ethnic violence. Universalized Ethnic Unity education texts explained the vio-
lence by reorganizing identity narratives in ways which invisibilized Uyghur
history and framed Turkic identities as threats: only “the Three Evils” (separa-
tists, terrorists, and extremists) dispute party-state narratives that Uyghurs are
“not a Turkic group” and “not an Islamic group”.126 The 2009 mass violence127
was described as “zero-sum political struggle of life or death” for China’s
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survival against “Three Evils” and “scum of the nation”.128 The CCP under Xi
attempts to break these cycles and resolve narrative tensions between
imperialism, nationalism, and chauvinism, by reconstituting identities
through “fusion” to tightly hold Xinjiang’s peoples together “like pomegra-
nate seeds”.129 Since 2017, “fusion” includes mass extra-legal internment
camps as “Education and Transformation Centres” ( jiaoyu peixun zhongxin)
and inter-generational separation as “children’s rescue care centres” (ertong
jiuzhu guanaibaohu zhongxin). By 2018, scholars extrapolated from official
figures, estimating that 1.5 million people have been interned since appoint-
ment of regional party-chief, Chen Quanguo and intensification of “de-extre-
mification” in 2015.130 The CCP describes internment and inter-generational
separation in North America and Australia as settler colonialism but its com-
parable “fusion” practices as rational responses to Uyghur violence because
“happiness is the most important human right”.131
Commemorating the 2009 violence, Chinese artist, Baidiucao, captured the
global phenomena of genocide using Auschwitz gates to “remind the world
how evil China’s genocide is” (Figure 2).132 Xinjiang Auschwitz draws parallels
between Xinjiang’s camp system and Nazi concentration camps, collapsing
East–West binaries and communicating moral urgency to Anglophone audi-
ences “always looking for Birkenau”. Unlike “ethnic cleansing” in former Yugo-
slavia or mass killings at Auschwitz, CCP “fusion” desires barbarians’ attraction
to China and recognition of their own inauthenticity. Inter-generational sep-
aration in secure boarding facilities, described as “loving heart nurseries” and
“kindness kindergartens”, raise and educate around 100,000 Uyghur children
Figure 2. Baidiucao (2020) Xinjiang Auschwitz.
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from a few months old.133 Local government documents explain inter-gen-
erational separation helps children of parents “detained in re-education”
and those who “work”, “happily grow up under loving care of the Party”.134
Nevertheless, Uyghur parents describe how these practices coercively “separ-
ate” all families with children “living like orphans” in “jail”.135 One Han tea-
cher’s clothing donations appeal described children in “thin, torn, dirty, and
smelly clothing”, working in freezing winter classrooms,136 while parents
engage in seasonal work.137 These genocidal practices go “beyond physical
annihilation”, using “mechanisms of symbolic enactment” to re-organize
social relations and identity for China’s “happiness”.138
China’s internment camps target groups’ cultural foundations, irreducible
to politicide, counterterrorism, or Islamophobia. XUAR Justice Department
Party Secretary, Zhang Yun, explained policies target Uyghurs because at
least 30 per cent must be “re-educated” as “extremists” while 70 per cent
are vulnerable to “extremism”, linked to “ideological viruses” of Uyghur
attachments to language and religion.139 Xinjiang Victims Database records
disappearances and family testimonies, listing most known Uyghur intellec-
tuals and artists: Rahile Dawut for academic research on pre-Islamic shrines,
Sanubar Tursun and Abdurehim Heyit for performing folk music, and Adil
Mijit, a government arts troupe comedian.140 Targeting cultural institutions
and highly-trained intellectuals for “re-education” and “vocational training”
illustrates their goal of re-organizing Uyghur-ness. Eliticide,141 systematic tar-
geting of community figures to prevent resistance to genocides, is well-docu-
mented in diaspora art. Sulu Artco, an “artivist collective raising awareness
about disappearing Uyghur artists, intellectuals, and scholars” captured inter-
national attention using social-media hashtags, #MeTooUyghur (Figure 3),
illustrating the silencing of moderate intellectuals as metaphor for elimin-
ation of Uyghur cultural foundations.142
Beyond eliticide, “population Data Collection Forms” use AI facial-recog-
nition technology, determining detainments in bureaucratic exercises collat-
ing scores by “ethnicity”, “religion”, “holding a passport”, “having foreign
contacts”, or “relatives in detention”.143 The group is targeted as a group,
dividing people as “safe, average, and unsafe”, constituting “average”
Uyghurs as potential threats. Administrative classification of detainees
defines 3 categories of participants in “terrorist or extremist activities”:
those “not serious enough to constitute a crime”, those who “demonstrated
willingness to receive training”, and those completing prison sentences but
“ordered by people’s courts to receive education”.144 These categories’
scope is limitless and represent superficial organizational measures that
conceal essential principles of arbitrary, extra-legal selection to deprive Xin-
jiang’s peoples of any “right to rights”.145
Detainees’ families are ordinarily given no reasons for disappearances.
Explanations given to released detainees recorded by XVD are mirrored in
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official documents leaked by the ICIJ, including extra-legal sentences for
“wearing a headscarf” or “bearing more children than permitted”.146
Reasons given to families publicly campaigning for information about disap-
peared relatives include: not greeting officials appropriately, not smoking, not
watching state television, using whatsapp messenger, “contractual require-
ments” to maintain employment, being born in the 1980s–1990s (“untrust-
worthy generation”), “staying too long in Kazakhstan” and being exposed
to “foreign thought”, “applying for a foreign visa”, and writing letters to
gain information about family whereabouts.147 Official government docu-
ments summarize the system’s immediate goals as “de-extremification” and
“vocational training”, using Xi’s slogans, “preparing for dangers in advance”
and “never forget our original mission”.148 The system targets Xinjiang’s Indi-
genous peoples per se by framing innocuous behaviours as “terrorist activi-
ties” and threats to China’s “mission” demanding extra-legal detainment.
Isolating and concentrating peoples in camps creates conditions where
they exist outside law and no longer belong to community, confirming
Figure 3. Sulu.art.co (2020) #MeTooUyghur.
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“the fundamental belief of totalitarianism that everything is possible”.149
Former detainees’ testimonies to US Congress, human rights organizations,
journalists, and scholars, describe camp conditions: cramped rooms with
no sanitation, beatings and torture for crying or using Uyghur language,
poor nutrition, daily renunciations of Islam and praising Xi for food, and mul-
tiple gang-rapes by guards as punishment with prisoners forced to watch the
violence.150 Gulzira Auelhan had been “exposed to foreign thought” by
staying “too long” in Kazakhstan, testifying how she and detainees, aged
17–72 were kept in rooms with up to 60 people and repeatedly hit with elec-
tric batons (“always on the head”) when exceeding two-minute toilet breaks.
Surveillance cameras monitor detainees’ behaviour and emotional responses,
with crying leading to punishment of 14 hours sitting upright on hard chairs
for being “infected with bad thoughts”. 151 Amanzhan Seiituly described
beatings and solitary confinement for using “wrong words” or being
unable to sing the national anthem.152 These violent performative rituals
show Uyghurs “everything is possible”, reversing humiliation through
sexual violence against Uyghur bodies as “colonial manipulations” and
superfluous objects in China’s “historic mission”.
Uyghur diaspora artists and intellectuals describe the absence of infor-
mation on family wellbeing as “trauma”. Families know anything is possible,
triggering experiences that mirror Indigenous “suicidal despair” “under colo-
nial genocide” and concentration camp survivors’ trauma.153 UK-based
Uyghur writer, Aziz Isa’s dramatized short film, Unanswered Telephone Call,
documents his experiences after being denied a visa and telephone access
to his grieving mother following his father’s death. Aziz writes, “I had
become so powerless that I couldn’t even protect my own right to speak
to my own parents, and had no idea whether they were alive or dead”, yet
this “still continues”.154 Aziz describes CCP policy since 1949 as “slow geno-
cide”: “they don’t use machine guns or gas chambers… they believe they
can do anything… the aim is to make you mentally ill”.155 Uyghur linguist
Ablimit Baki’s diaspora narratives project explains how family separation is
felt “as trauma, but also as torture”.156 Yusuf, a UK-based Uyghur described
three years of family separation: “not knowing their health and wellbeing is
slowly pushing my anxiety to an abyss of depression”. Abdul in Norway,
described mental “torture”, asking “what is my crime to be separated from
my family?”. Camp survivors and separated relatives experience social
death and suffer post-traumatic stress, well-documented humiliation tech-
niques in European genocides.157 Gulzira Auelhan testified to repeated trig-
gering of experiences of sexual violence when her identity card activates
metal detectors across Xinjiang’s public spaces, resulting in automatic
police interrogation.158
Diaspora artist, Yi Xiaocuo considers “not knowing” as “trauma” and pro-
vides an online art platform, Camp Album, to support separated families.159
ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 15
Daily Reflection of a Xinjiang Person (Figure 4) portrays “perpetual silence,
stigma, and representational violence they always have to face alone”, reflect-
ing Indigenous trauma that “anything is possible” in perpetual states of emer-
gency.160 The body is overwhelmed and identity invisibilized by inscriptions
of long-term official narratives enabling genocide: “Western region, good at
drinking, separatism, uncivilized, backward, frontier, good at singing and
dancing, kebab, ethnic minority, East Turkistan, poverty, superstitious, inde-
pendence, hand-pulled noodle, backward, traitor, thief district, terrorism,
extremism, exotic, little sister, undeveloped, sexy, foreign forces”. Daily Reflec-
tion illustrates how ethnic groups survive physical violence but experience
Figure 4. Yi Xiaocuo (2020) Daily Reflection of a Xinjiang Person.
16 D. TOBIN
long-term social death, invisibilized by official celebrations of modernization
and cultural unity.
Conclusions
This paper showed how genocidal practices in China seek to secure an ima-
gined non-Western, civilizational identity, enabled by narratives on Turkic
otherness, backwardness, and threat. CCP “fusion” policy interweaves seman-
tically hybrid Western and Chinese narratives, colonial and anti-colonial,
seeking to reverse nineteenth century colonial humiliation in twenty-first
century elimination of Xinjiang’s Turkic Muslim identities. Popular under-
standings of genocide as physical destruction reflect mid-twentieth century
biological conceptions of identity, limiting practitioners’ ability to detect
and understand new genocides by attrition. Internment camps and inter-gen-
erational separation promote social death and “destruction of essential foun-
dations” of Xinjiang’s Turkic peoples by preventing transmission of identity
practices.161 Although China Studies effectively critiques assertions of
China’s ethnic homogeneity in eurocentric nationalism literature, it is less
effective in addressing the implications of ethnocentrism in Xinjiang, partly
because camps to isolate peoples are associated with colonial genocides
and fascism, outside its traditional knowledge boundaries.
CCP ethnic policy documents explain concrete decision-making through
teleological progress towards China’s modernization and “original mission”.
The Great Revival’s elimination of ethnic difference blurs historical materialist
progress and culturalist romanticism, resembling German Fascism’s paradox-
ical mission of national progress to revive “great cultural achievements of
antiquity” by “radical removal” of “inferior elements” opposed to the state’s
philosophy.162 However, China’s “re-education” camp system practices iso-
lation not expulsion, demanding Uyghur recognition of Han cultural superior-
ity and their own “backwardness”. “Fusion” policy destroys, in part, the
foundations of groups’ life, language, religion, and inter-generational cultural
transmission, resolving the “ethnic problem” through social death of Turkic
Muslims. The trauma of sexual violence, posting of male cadres to sleep
with wives of interned men, and sterilization are well-documented in per-
sonal testimonies.163 These genocidal practices emerge from generations of
debate about how to socially organize ethnic identities to enhance China’s
state power.
Genocide is always cultural in intent and effect. China’s 2012 ethnic policy
debates on resolving the “ethnic problem” with economic development or
identity-engineering recycled Republican-era contestations over saving
China through assimilation or separation for the “5 races” in Xi’s “new era”.
These narratives are consistent with Card’s idea of social death and Feier-
stein’s conceptualization of genocide as technologies of power to
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reconstitute group identities. “Fusion” in Xinjiang’s internment camps aims to
transform adults while inter-generational separation prevents cultural trans-
mission of language and religion, framed as security measures against threats
of terrorism and backwardness to progress and “happiness”. Former detai-
nees are monitored and families abroad disconnected after leaving the
camp system, perpetuating trauma that anything is possible. The camps
“teach barbarians to be Chinese” through violent humiliation and “re-edu-
cation”. “Re-education” and torture in camps cannot attract barbarians or
transform identities but prevent their maintenance through trauma and
severing intra-ethnic contact.
China’s genocidal “fusion” politics projects global power anxieties (“back-
ward nations get beaten”) inwards onto Xinjiang’s Turkic peoples. The CCP
describes Western decline as “window of opportunity”, explaining that
mass internment camps will defeat the “foundations of separatism”, Turkic
and Islamic identities, “forever”.164 The party-state’s conceptualization of
China has gradually shifted from nominal cultural pluralism (56minzu) to cul-
tural nationalism (Zhonghua Minzu) but preserves long-term narratives that
non-Han frontiers are cultural and political problems for China. The self-per-
ceived threatened state’s genocidal narratives persisted in plain sight and are
now implemented in monolingual-medium education in Inner Mongolia165
and Hui Muslim communities.166 Internment camps, used by European set-
tlers to isolate Native Americans and Australian Aboriginal peoples as
threats to colonial state-building, seek to convince Xinjiang’s peoples of
the paradox that they have always been Chinese and culturally behind the
Han. The party-state adapts sovereignty, a principle it considers European,
to assert China’s right to practice genocide. Disagreements on “fruitful
results of de-radicalization measures in Xinjiang” are considered intervention
and “disrespect for the modernization process of the Chinese people”. 167 His-
tory’s tragic “cyclical order” defies modernist teleological conceptualizations
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